Key findings
• Frequency: the leaders meet 4 to 6 times a year on published calendars and name the next meeting date in every statement. The Central Bank of Egypt meets 8 times. The CFA unions (BCEAO and BEAC) meet quarterly. The least active banks publish no calendar at all.
• Depth: top statements run to many pages, with quantified forecasts, risk scenarios and, in South Africa's case, a model-based rate path and a published vote split. Bottom-tier outputs are one-paragraph notices, Governor's circulars or board-meeting photos.
• More than one voice: the SARB's regional Monetary Policy Forums, Ghana's published Submissions by Members, Namibia's and The Gambia's full minutes, and Rwanda's team presentations show how Chief Economists and other MPC members can be heard. Most Tier 2 banks still rely on the Governor alone.
• Local languages: genuine translation is rare. Liberia (Simple Liberian English), Tanzania (Kiswahili), Botswana (Setswana) and Nigeria (Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Pidgin notices on X) are the clearest cases found.
• Surprises: Ghana, Liberia and The Gambia are better communicators than their bigger peers. Angola rotates MPC meetings to the provinces. Morocco's Bank Al-Maghrib is near Tier 1 but under-read because it publishes in Arabic and French.
• The CFA problem: 14 countries rely on one French-only communiqué from Dakar or Yaoundé, with no English, Portuguese or Spanish version and no national briefing.
• Social media: Rwanda, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa lead on X as well, with Rwanda the most interactive through X Spaces and replays. Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia post MPC decisions on X far better than their overall scores suggest. Namibia, Botswana and Mauritius are the reverse: strong on their websites, quieter on social platforms. The BEAC's X account has no posts and the BCEAO's is low-activity. Egypt launched Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and YouTube channels in August 2025 instead of relying on X (section 8).
The big economies lag their weight
Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, the DRC and Ethiopia should be setting the standard, but none reaches Tier 1 (section 4.14):
• Nigeria: Africa's most populous country needs a more detailed MPC presentation, with greater insights from other MPC members including their chief economist. The Governor should use far more infographics, and the CBN should add a second review session.
• Egypt: one of Africa's largest and most populous economies should be louder. It should hold MPC press conferences, run more detailed sessions, promote its decisions more and translate beyond Arabic and English.
• DRC and Ethiopia: the DRC is a vast mineral economy and has a big population; Ethiopia is Africa's second most populous country and its diplomatic capital. Both should hold live MPC press conferences plus a follow-up review meeting, and publish in both English and French as well as their main national languages.
• South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt together: as the three economic giants, all three should run a second MPC review meeting after every decision, with other members and chief economists presenting, and build data-rich infographics into the Governor's presentation.
• Kenya: as East Africa's largest economy, with a large international media presence, the CBK should add a second MPC review meeting at which other MPC members and its chief economist present.
The rankings at a glance
|
Top 10: most active and comprehensive |
Least active (from the bottom) |
|
1 South African Reserve Bank |
42 Bank of Eritrea |
|
2 Bank of Ghana |
41 Central Bank of Djibouti |
|
3 Bank of Namibia |
40 Central Bank of Somalia |
|
4 Bank of Botswana |
39 Central Bank of Libya |
|
5 National Bank of Rwanda |
38 Central Bank of Sudan |
|
6 Bank of Mauritius |
37 Bank of South Sudan |
|
7 Central Bank of Nigeria |
36 Banque Centrale des Comores |
|
8 Central Bank of Liberia |
35 Banco Central de São Tomé e Príncipe |
|
9 Bank Al-Maghrib (Morocco) |
34 Banque d'Algérie |
|
10 Central Bank of Kenya |
33 Banque de la République du Burundi |
The full 42-row ranking is in section 7 and the scoring method in section 2.
1. The landscape: 54 countries, 42 monetary authorities, five languages
Africa has 54 sovereign states but only about 42 bodies that actually set monetary policy, because 14 countries share two regional central banks. Anyone trying to monitor "African central banks" is therefore following 40 national institutions plus two supranational ones, publishing in five official languages.
The two CFA franc unions
• BCEAO (Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest): headquartered in Dakar, it sets one policy rate for the eight UEMOA states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese-speaking), Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Its Comité de Politique Monétaire (CPM) meets quarterly.
• BEAC (Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale): headquartered in Yaoundé, it sets policy for the six CEMAC states: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea (Africa's only Spanish-speaking state). Its CPM also meets roughly quarterly.
For these 14 countries, the national "agencies" of the BCEAO and BEAC do not set policy. A Senegalese or Gabonese reader looking for an MPC statement on a national website will not find one, and that is by design rather than neglect.
Pegged, currency-board and conflict-affected regimes
• Common Monetary Area (CMA): Lesotho, Eswatini and Namibia peg one-to-one to the South African rand. Their MPCs mostly follow the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), so the main communication job is explaining the peg and any rate differential.
• Comoros: pegs to the euro through the Banque Centrale des Comores.
• Djibouti: runs a currency board against the US dollar, so it has no rate-setting MPC at all.
• Conflict and post-conflict settings: Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan operate with limited or suspended rate-setting frameworks.
The language split
|
Language group |
Monetary authorities (approx.) |
Examples |
|
English |
~17 |
SARB, CBK, CBN, BoG, BNR, BoU, BoZ, BoT |
|
French |
~10, incl. BCEAO and BEAC |
BCEAO, BEAC, BCC (DRC), BRB (Burundi), BCRG (Guinea), BFM (Madagascar), BCC (Comoros) |
|
Portuguese |
4 national + Guinea-Bissau via BCEAO |
Banco de Moçambique, BNA (Angola), BCV (Cabo Verde), BCSTP (São Tomé) |
|
Arabic (often with French/English) |
~8 |
CBE (Egypt), Bank Al-Maghrib, BCT (Tunisia), Bank of Algeria, CBL (Libya), CBoS (Sudan), BCM (Mauritania) |
|
Spanish |
1 national (Equatorial Guinea via BEAC) |
BEAC |
The practical consequence is that the best-covered central banks in international media are English-speaking. Strong communicators in French or Portuguese, such as Bank Al-Maghrib or Banco de Moçambique, are systematically under-noticed by English-language analysts, while weak English-speaking communicators still get coverage because Reuters and Bloomberg can read them.
Why communication matters more here than elsewhere
In most African economies, a large share of savers and borrowers sit outside the formal banking system, monetary transmission is weak, and inflation expectations are shaped by the food and fuel prices people see every day. If you did a quick survey in an African market for example (Gikomba market, Nairobi, Kenya) and ask the traders what a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is, and how their decisions affect them, you might get blank stares and many have probably never heard of it. To many people, the meetings and their messaging seem targeted towards the middle class, upper middle class and the elites. The technical terms also make little sense to them. These central banks therefore have a lot of work to do to simplify and localize their messaging. They should probably have some of their meetings in such locations and invite locals into their audience.
A policy rate that nobody hears about does little. That is why the gap between a central bank that publishes a 15-page statement, a slide deck, a recorded press conference and a local-language summary, and one that posts a five-line notice weeks late, matters for whether policy works at all. So African central banks need to work harder in making sure their decisions are published, and simplified in a manner which the regular citizen on the street understands them.
The SARB MPC Schools Challenge: A Model for Africa's Central Banks
Since 2012, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has run the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) Schools Challenge, its flagship public-education initiative for Grade 12 learners. The competition began as a pilot with the Department of Basic Education and lets matric students take on the role of SARB MPC members by writing an MPC statement. Each school enters a team of four learners who take Economics and pure Mathematics, and the teams and their teachers attend a full-day workshop led by SARB economists on monetary policy, data analysis and presentation skills.
Shortlisted finalists then present their statements to a panel of senior SARB economists in a format modelled on the real MPC press conference. The programme has grown well beyond its Gauteng roots: it now reaches more than 2,000 matric learners each year, and members of the winning team receive full bursaries if they meet the criteria, along with a cash prize and an iPad. In the video, the 2025 finalists and their teachers describe what they gained. That year Midrand High School in Gauteng won, and in 2026 Michaelhouse in KwaZulu-Natal took first place. The programme now feeds back into the bank itself: some of the SARB economists who support learners are former participants.
Other African central banks, such as the Central Bank of Nigeria, Bank of Ghana, Central Bank of Kenya, Bank of Uganda, BCEAO and BEAC, could adapt this model at modest cost and with a large return. Many African economies face persistent inflation, currency pressure and low financial literacy. Teaching young people why policy rates move, and what MPC statements actually mean, helps build public trust in central bank decisions and makes communication more effective.
A local version could partner with education ministries, align with national curricula, run regional heats to include rural schools, and offer bursaries or internships to create a pipeline of future economists. Regional bodies such as the Association of African Central Banks, or monetary unions like the West African Economic and Monetary Union, could even host a continental final, encouraging young Africans to think about monetary policy across borders. In short, the SARB has shown that turning the MPC into a classroom exercise turns abstract policy into something young people can understand and engage with, a lesson the rest of the continent could put to good use. The Reserve Bank of Zimababwe recently launched its inaugural Schools Monetary Policy Challenge on July 10, 2026. The Schools Monetary Policy Challenge is an awesome idea that should be replicated through out the continent. This can even be done for Statistics, Maths and other subjects that can help build financial and economic literacy etc through out the continent.
2. How the banks were scored
Each of the 42 monetary authorities was scored out of 100 on seven criteria, using MPC outputs published between January and 12 October 2026. Evidence came from the banks' own websites (statements, minutes, reports, calendars), from the BIS speech archive, and from national financial press in English, French, Portuguese and Arabic.
|
Criterion |
Points |
What earns full marks |
|
Regularity and calendar |
20 |
Six or more scheduled meetings, dates published a year ahead, every date kept |
|
Statement depth |
20 |
Global, domestic, inflation, growth, external and financial sections; quantified forecasts; risks; next meeting date |
|
Live briefing |
15 |
Governor's press conference with open Q&A, streamed and archived |
|
Second layer |
15 |
Minutes, vote counts or individual members' views, plus a regular Monetary Policy Report |
|
Follow-up and multiple voices |
15 |
Post-MPC forums, regional roadshows, Chief Economist or Deputy Governors presenting |
|
Accessibility |
10 |
Local-language versions, plain-language summaries, infographics |
|
Digital freshness |
5 |
Latest MPC output on the bank's own site within days; active social channels |
|
Total |
100 |
|
Tiers: Tier 1 scores 75 or more; Tier 2 scores 55 to 74; Tier 3 scores 35 to 54; Tier 4 scores below 35.
Limitations
• Judgement, not formula. Scores are the author's assessment of the evidence found. Two analysts would differ by a few points; they should not differ by tiers.
• What search could reach. Some banks post statements as scanned PDFs or on slow sites, and a missing document may exist offline. Where a 2026 output could not be found, the tables say "none found" rather than "none exists".
• Social media. Social activity counts for only 5 points in the composite. Section 8 adds a separate survey of X and other accounts and keeps it as its own ranking rather than changing the composite scores.
• Structural cases. Djibouti (currency board) and Somalia (dollarized) cannot run a conventional MPC. They rank low on communication, which is not a judgement of their staff's competence.
• Unions. The BCEAO and BEAC are each scored once, as the single policy-setter for their members.
3. Tier 1: the leaders
Six central banks clear every bar in 2026: a published calendar they keep, long analytical statements, a live and recorded Governor briefing, a second layer of publications (minutes, member submissions, a forecast report), and some form of follow-up outreach. South Africa and Ghana lead; Namibia, Botswana, Rwanda and Mauritius follow closely. South Africa scores 90; Botswana and Rwanda are level on 81.
3.1 South African Reserve Bank (SARB): the continental benchmark
Frequency: six scheduled MPC announcements a year, with dates published well in advance. The 2026 calendar listed 23 July, 23 September and 19 November as the remaining dates, and the bank has kept them.
Depth: the statement is long, model-based and explicit about uncertainty. In September 2026 the MPC raised the repo rate 25 basis points to 7.25%; the Governor cited Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) output for the rate path and walked through two alternative scenarios, one with higher global rates and one with higher inflation expectations and wages (SAnews). The July 2026 decision was a 4–2 split vote, and the vote count was public (Lines.com).
Presentation: the Governor reads the statement at a live press conference, streamed and clipped on X, with a one-page visual summary posted the same day (EWN).
Follow-up, the part most banks skip: after each twice-yearly Monetary Policy Review, the SARB runs a National Monetary Policy Forum followed by regional forums. The October 2026 round runs from 6 to 27 October across Polokwane, Durban, Mbombela, East London, Bloemfontein, Mahikeng and Cape Town (SARB MPF page). The MPC has up to seven members, including the Chief Economist; Dr Konstantin Makrelov was appointed Chief Economist and MPC member in May 2026 (SARB release), and senior economists present at these forums.
Gap: statements are English-only. Translation into isiZulu, isiXhosa, Afrikaans or Sesotho would be a cheap win for the continent's best-resourced central bank, and the forums are tied to the twice-yearly Review rather than every decision (section 3.8).
3.2 Bank of Ghana (BoG): the most transparent on individual views
Ghana deserves promotion out of the "could do better" group. In 2026 the BoG held its 128th to 132nd MPC meetings every two months, in January, March, May, July and September, each with a press release on the final day (BoG MPC releases).
What sets it apart is the second layer. For the July 2026 meeting it published MPC Decision Statement – Submissions by Members, with each member's reasoning, plus a full transcript of the press briefing and a Bi-Monthly Publication of Questions from the Media (BoG). Few central banks anywhere publish individual members' written submissions. It is the clearest example on the continent of letting other MPC members speak, done in writing. On X, @thebankofghana carries briefings, excerpts and post-MPC engagement with banks (section 8).
Gap: no regional roadshow equivalent to the SARB's, no member or Chief Economist presenting in person, and no local-language versions (Twi, Ewe, Ga, Dagbani).
3.3 National Bank of Rwanda (BNR): the team presentation model
The BNR announces the MPC decision together with its Financial Stability Committee (FSC) statement as a single Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Statement, presented at one press conference. 2026 has been a busy year: hikes to 7.25% in February, 8.25% in May and 8.75% in August as inflation reached 14.5% in July (KT Press). A fourth statement followed in October 2026, recorded and posted on the bank's YouTube channel, so the public now has an archived replay like those Kenya and Nigeria provide. That makes four statements in the first ten months of the year: February, May, August and October.
The presentation is a team effort. Governor Soraya Hakuziyaremye presents with her team. The Chief Economist presents the growth projections, as Thierry Kalisa did at the February 2025 briefing (The New Times). Deputy Governor Nick Barigye followed the February 2026 decision with a long-form newspaper interview explaining it (The New Times). Statements are detailed: headline, core, fresh-food and energy inflation are each broken out, with a dated forecast of when inflation returns to the 2–8% band.
The October statement came in the same month the IMF reached staff-level agreement on Rwanda's Extended Credit Facility review, noting that the BNR had tightened policy and that inflation had breached the programme's consultation band (IMF). On X, @CentralBankRw posts detailed breakdowns, replays and X Spaces and monitors public sentiment, the most interactive social practice on the continent (section 8). The recorded statement and this follow-up activity lift Rwanda's composite score to 81, level with Botswana.
Gap: a calendar published a year ahead would help markets and the press plan around these statements, and a Kinyarwanda summary would widen their reach.
3.4 Bank of Namibia (BoN): minutes, slides and stakeholder briefings
The BoN meets bi-monthly (six times a year) and publishes, for each meeting, a media statement, a slide deck, and full MPC minutes listing every member and every staff economist present (June 2026 minutes). Every statement names the next meeting date; the August 2026 statement set 26–27 October (BoN).
In February 2026 the BoN added its first independent external MPC member, Dr John Steytler, and a young in-house economist, Helvi Fillipus (BoN). It also runs a separate Monetary Policy Announcement: Stakeholder Engagement presentation by the Governor; the latest was dated 23 July 2026 (BoN). On X, @BankofNamibia posts decisions and hosted policy dialogues, but less often than its website output deserves.
Gap: no Oshiwambo or Afrikaans versions. Most decisions shadow the SARB, so the analytical burden is lighter.
3.5 Bank of Botswana (BoB): media briefings and Setswana releases
The BoB's MPC meets roughly every two months, with 2026 meetings on 26 February, 30 April, 18 June and 27 August, and the next set for 29 October (BoB; Capmad). It publishes three layers: an annual Monetary Policy Statement each February, periodic Monetary Policy Reports, and a media briefing after every MPC meeting (BoB MPS 2026).
Botswana is also one of the few banks that translates. Its press-release list includes a Setswana version of the December 2025 MPC decision, titled Pego ya Dikgang – Tshwetso ya Komiti ya Banka ya Botswana… (MPC) (BoB press releases). When inflation jumped from 4.2% in March to 10.3% in April 2026, the bank responded with a 200-basis-point hike on 30 April.
Gap: social posting on @BankofBotswana is periodic, and no infographic or one-page summary was found.
3.6 Bank of Mauritius (BoM): minutes two weeks later
The BoM's MPC is small-country, high-quality. The February 2026 statement announced the decision, gave the inflation and growth forecasts, and committed to releasing the minutes on 25 February, exactly two weeks later (BoM). The Governor's opening statement at the post-MPC press conference is long enough to be republished by the BIS (BIS). Published rate data show the Key Rate moved to 4.75% in May 2026 (BoM).
Gap: no Kreol Morisien summary, though Kreol is the language most Mauritians speak at home, and only occasional MPC posts on X.
3.7 Tier 1 side by side
The six leaders reach Tier 1 by different routes. None of them does everything, which is why even the top scorer sits at 90 rather than 100.
|
Practice |
SARB |
Ghana |
Namibia |
Botswana |
Rwanda |
Mauritius |
|
Meetings a year |
6 |
6 |
6 |
About 6 |
4 (Feb, May, Aug, Oct 2026) |
About 4 |
|
Next date in every statement |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Not always |
Yes |
|
Governor's live briefing |
Yes, streamed |
Yes, transcript published |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes, recorded on YouTube |
Yes |
|
Other members or chief economist present |
At Monetary Policy Forums |
No (in writing only) |
At stakeholder engagements |
No |
Yes, team presentation |
No |
|
Second review session |
Twice a year, after the Monetary Policy Review |
No |
Stakeholder engagement deck |
No |
Interviews, X Spaces |
No |
|
Minutes or member views |
Vote split |
Written member submissions |
Full minutes |
No |
No |
Minutes after 2 weeks |
|
Forecast report |
Monetary Policy Review, twice a year |
Monetary Policy Report |
Slide deck |
Annual statement plus reports |
Joint MPC and FSC statement |
Inflation and growth forecasts |
|
Infographic or one-page summary |
Yes, one-page visual on X |
Not found |
Slide deck |
Not found |
Breakdowns on X |
Not found |
|
Social tier on X (section 8) |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
|
Local-language version |
No |
No |
No |
Setswana |
Not found |
No |
3.8 What even the leaders should add
South Africa should go further, as one of Africa's largest economies. The SARB's Monetary Policy Forums are tied to its twice-yearly Monetary Policy Review, not to each of its six MPC decisions.
The SARB, alongside Nigeria and Egypt (section 4.14), should add:
• A second MPC review meeting after every decision, not only twice a year, where other MPC members and the Chief Economist present the forecast, the scenarios and the data behind the vote.
• Data-rich infographics inside the Governor's presentation, not only a summary image posted afterwards: simplified charts of inflation by component, the rate path, wage settlements, fuel prices and household credit.
• Translations of the summary into isiZulu, isiXhosa, Sesotho and Afrikaans.
For the others:
• Ghana: put individual MPC members or the Chief Economist on the platform, not only in writing, and add visuals to its transcripts.
• Namibia and Botswana: hold stakeholder engagements after every meeting, post infographics alongside the slides, and push minutes and Setswana releases harder on social media.
• Rwanda: publish a calendar a year ahead and a Kinyarwanda summary.
• Mauritius: add a second session, Kreol summaries and more regular social posting.
3.9 What the leaders teach the big economies
The Tier 1 banks show that a second session and multiple voices are affordable even for small institutions. Namibia (population around 3 million) publishes full minutes and runs stakeholder engagements; Rwanda presents as a team; Ghana publishes every member's reasoning. Africa's largest and most populous economies have bigger research departments and richer statistical systems than any of these. They have no capacity excuse for doing less.
4. Tiers 2 and 3: regular, but one layer short
Tier 2 banks meet on schedule and publish substantive statements, and most hold a Governor's press conference. What they mostly lack is the second voice: minutes, individual member views, a Chief Economist presenting the forecast, or regional follow-up sessions. Several, notably Liberia and The Gambia, are better than their reputation.
4.1 Central Bank of Kenya (CBK)
The CBK meets six times a year and publishes a press release the same day. The 7 October 2026 release (hold at 8.75%) covered global growth, inflation, food prices, the CEOs Survey, the Market Perceptions Survey, the current account and private-sector credit, and named December 2026 as the next meeting (CBK). The Governor holds a post-MPC media briefing the day after, and the videos are archived on the CBK site for every meeting from 2023 to 2026 (CBK multimedia) and streamed on YouTube. The CBK's report to Parliament says the Governor also held virtual post-MPC meetings with stakeholders after each meeting (Parliament of Kenya).
What would lift Kenya to Tier 1: a second MPC review meeting where other members and the chief economist present, published minutes or a vote count, and Kiswahili and French summaries. Section 4.14 sets out the full package.
4.2 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
Under Governor Olayemi Cardoso the CBN has rebuilt its MPC rhythm after the 2023 postponements, when two consecutive meetings were cancelled (Peoples Gazette). In 2026 it held the 304th (February), 305th (May), 306th (July) and 307th (September) meetings. The September meeting cut the rate 350 basis points to 23% (Nairametrics). Each ends with a live-streamed press briefing archived on the CBN homepage (CBN). The communiqué lists every policy parameter: MPR, corridor, CRR for banks and merchant banks, non-TSA public deposits and the liquidity ratio (Financial Edge). On X, @cenbank posts the full communiqué with a PDF link promptly to a large audience.
The CBN is also one of the few banks to use local languages. It announced its 299th MPC meeting on X in Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Pidgin (21st Century Chronicle). The next steps are to translate the decision itself, not just the meeting notice, to add infographics, and to hold a second MPC review meeting (section 4.14).
4.3 Central Bank of Egypt (CBE)
The CBE runs eight scheduled meetings a year. 2026 decisions were published for February, April, May, 9 July, 20 August and 24 September (Egypt Today; Bnok24). Statements are bilingual (Arabic and English), discuss the inflation path quarter by quarter, and say explicitly when forecasts are revised. The CBE does not hold a press conference after its meetings, which keeps it out of Tier 1. It launched Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and YouTube channels in August 2025 but makes little use of X. For an economy of Egypt's size it should add a press conference, a second review meeting, more visible decision posts and further translations (section 4.14).
4.4 Bank Al-Maghrib (Morocco)
Bank Al-Maghrib meets quarterly (March, June, September, December). Each meeting produces a communiqué, a Rapport sur la politique monétaire with full forecasts, and normally a press conference by the Wali. The September 2026 press point was cancelled only because the meeting fell in the last hours of an election campaign, and the bank explained why in advance (Le Matin). It also meets major economic actors after Council meetings; in September 2025 that was the OCP Group (Hespress). Morocco is arguably Tier 1 on substance; it sits lower because four meetings a year and Arabic/French-only output limit its reach to non-Francophone analysts.
4.5 Bank of Uganda (BoU)
The BoU publishes two documents per meeting: a full Monetary Policy Statement and a one-page Monetary Policy Statement – at a glance infographic (BoU August 2026 at a glance). The plain-language one-pager is a good model for others. 2026 meetings were February, May and 13 August, each holding the CBR at 9.75% (BoU). The full statement is short, about two pages. No Luganda or Swahili version was found. Uganda is one of the most active banks on X (@BOU_Official), well above its overall rank of 14. (Late addition)Bank of Uganda held an emergency Monetary Policy Committee meeting held on Wednesday, October 14, 2026, and raised its benchmark Central Bank Rate (CBR) by 225 basis points from 9.75% to 12.00%
4.6 Bank of Tanzania (BoT)
Since adopting an interest-rate framework in 2024, the BoT sets a Central Bank Rate quarterly. It numbers its MPC statements (MPC No. 245 on 7 October 2026 maintained the Central Bank Rate (CBR) at 6.25 Percent) and always names the next meeting date (BoT). It also publishes a quarterly Monetary Policy Report (BoT). The decision is announced by the Governor the day after the meeting. The BoT has historically published key documents in Kiswahili as well as English, and posts often in Kiswahili on X, Facebook and Instagram, which is a real advantage.
4.7 Bank of Zambia (BoZ)
The BoZ meets quarterly. The Governor gives a live press briefing, and a circular to banks follows the same day with the new rate (Lusaka Times; RegAlert). Statements include a quantified inflation forecast by quarter. 2026 decisions were a 75 bp cut in February, a 25 bp cut in May and a 28–29 September meeting, posted on X (@BankofZambia) with links to the statement.
4.8 Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM)
The RBM held meetings in March, April, August and September 2026, each with a statement read by the Governor and a named date for the next decision (MBC; Nairametrics). The state broadcaster carries the decisions. A Chichewa summary would be a natural addition given the MBC's bilingual reach.
4.9 Banco de Moçambique and Banco Nacional de Angola (Lusophone pair)
Both meet roughly every two months, announce through the Governor, and publish detailed Portuguese communiqués.
• Mozambique: the CPMO met in January, March, May and later in 2026, holding MIMO at 9.25% (AIM). Communiqués cover inflation, reserves, domestic debt and reserve requirements. The bank publishes no English version, which limits its international reach.
• Angola: the BNA does something no other bank in this survey does: it rotates CPM meetings around the provinces. The July 2026 meeting (the 130th) was held in Malanje, and the next was set for Luanda (Ver Angola). The September meeting cut the BNA rate to 14.75% and named 16–17 November as the next date (Ver Angola). The Governor reads the final communiqué publicly.
4.10 The CMA pair: Lesotho and Eswatini
• Central Bank of Lesotho: meets about every two months; 2026 statements included the 117th MPC in February (CBL). Decisions are announced by the Governor and focus on the Net International Reserves floor that protects the peg. The website was slow to update its MPC page in past cycles, and its X account is sparse.
• Central Bank of Eswatini: uses a Monetary Policy Consultative Committee (MPCC) that includes outside voices, and hosts informal media sessions such as Coffee with the Governor 2.0 in June 2026, where directors also took questions (BIS). It did not automatically copy the SARB's May 2026 hike (Eswatini Observer), but followed in September (Rio Times). Its Facebook page posts each decision with a link to the full statement. A siSwati summary is missing.
4.11 Central Bank of Liberia (CBL): the surprise
Liberia is the most accessible communicator found in this review after the Tier 1 group. For July 2026, the CBL published three versions of the same MPC communiqué: the full technical text, a Simplified Version, and a version in Simple Liberian English, Liberia's vernacular (CBL). The simplified version explains what the rate means for farmers, market women and small businesses (CBL simplified communiqué). The MPC meets quarterly, numbers its communiqués, and read the October 2026 decision publicly on 6 October (AllAfrica).
4.12 Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG)
The CBG publishes, for each quarterly meeting, a press release, a Monetary Policy Report and full numbered minutes (Minutes of Meeting No. 97, February 2026), recording that all nine members attended (CBG minutes; CBG press release). The Governor briefs journalists after each meeting (Gambiana). For a small central bank this is an unusually complete package.
4.13 Other mid-table banks
• National Bank of Ethiopia: a young MPC (first meeting 2024) that now meets roughly quarterly and posts numbered press releases. July 2026 was the first time the Governor addressed the press directly after an MPC, with a written statement in English (NBE). Statements do not yet always state the new numerical rate (Addis Fortune). Section 4.14 sets out a fuller package.
• Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe: the MPC issues numbered resolutions, cutting the rate from 35% to 27.5% between June and September 2026 (Herald). Meeting dates are less predictable than in Tier 1, but its X account (@ReserveBankZIM) is one of the most active.
• Bank of Sierra Leone: quarterly MPC with a Governor's briefing; decisions reach the public mainly through local press (Awoko).
• Banque Centrale de Tunisie: the Board (Conseil d'Administration) sets the rate about every two months with a detailed French communiqué, most recently on 7 October 2026 (Kapitalis). There is no press conference and no separate MPC.
• Central Bank of Seychelles: quarterly decisions announced at a Governor's press conference (Nation).
• Banque Centrale du Congo (DRC): the CPM now runs on a more predictable calendar, with April and July 2026 decisions announced by the Governor (Actualite.cd; Capmad). See section 4.14 for what a country of its size should add.
• Banky Foiben'i Madagasikara: quarterly Comité monétaire with a Governor's press meeting (NewsMada).
• BCRG (Guinea): quarterly CPM with numbered communiqués (BCRG), but no 2026 communiqué surfaced in searches, only parliamentary speeches.
4.14 Spotlight: the big economies that should be setting the standard
Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, the DRC and Ethiopia should all be in Tier 1, and none is. Between them they hold well over half a billion people, several of the continent's largest GDPs, and the deepest pools of economic data outside South Africa. Their decisions move regional currencies, bond markets and trade flows, so the communication gap matters beyond their borders.
The common shortfall is not the decision statement itself. It is everything after it: a second review session, other MPC voices, plain-language and visual summaries, and translations that let regional media and investors follow the message.
|
Practice |
Kenya (CBK) |
Nigeria (CBN) |
Egypt (CBE) |
DR Congo (BCC) |
Ethiopia (NBE) |
|
Published calendar, next date named |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes, 8 meetings a year |
Improving |
Partly ("reconvene by" dates) |
|
Live Governor briefing |
Yes, archived on video |
Yes, live-streamed |
No |
Yes |
First in July 2026 |
|
Second MPC review meeting |
No (virtual stakeholder call with the Governor) |
No |
No |
No |
No |
|
Other MPC members or Chief Economist present |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
|
Minutes or individual member views |
No |
No minutes found |
No |
No |
No |
|
Infographic or one-page summary |
Not found |
Limited |
Not found |
No |
No |
|
Social channels (section 8) |
X and YouTube, tier 2 |
X, tier 1 |
Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, YouTube; tier 3 |
Not found |
Not found |
|
Language of MPC statement |
English |
English (meeting notices also in Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Pidgin) |
Arabic, English |
French |
English |
|
Languages to add |
Kiswahili, French |
Full summaries in Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Pidgin; French |
French; spoken Egyptian Arabic video |
English; Lingala, Kiswahili, Kikongo, Tshiluba |
French; Amharic, Afaan Oromo |
Kenya: East Africa's largest economy should run a two-stage MPC
Kenya is the largest economy in East Africa by most measures and one of the most closely watched countries on the continent. Nairobi hosts the regional bureaus of most international news organisations, a UN headquarters, and the African offices of many global banks and investors. When the CBK speaks, it is heard across the East African Community, in London and in New York.
The CBK's basics are good: six meetings a year, a detailed press release, a next-meeting date, and a Governor's briefing archived on video (CBK). Its statements already cite rich survey data, including the CEOs Survey and the Market Perceptions Survey. But the Governor is the only voice, and the post-MPC stakeholder sessions are virtual and Governor-led (Parliament of Kenya).
What Kenya should add
• A second MPC review meeting within one to two weeks of each decision, modelled on the SARB's Monetary Policy Forums and Rwanda's team presentations. The Governor opens, then the Director of Research (the CBK's chief economist role), a Deputy Governor and an external MPC member present the forecast, the risks and the survey results.
• Published individual views: minutes with a vote count two weeks after each meeting, or Ghana-style written member submissions.
• A Monetary Policy Report with fan charts at least twice a year, separate from the report to Parliament.
• Kiswahili versions of the press release and briefing, and a French summary for regional readers in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC.
• A one-page infographic on the day of the decision, posted to @CBKKenya and the website.
Nigeria: Africa's most populous country needs pictures and a second session
The CBN speaks for Africa's most populous country and one of its largest economies, and its decisions are tracked closely by portfolio investors. It has rebuilt a regular rhythm under Governor Cardoso (four meetings to September 2026), live-streams the briefing (CBN), and posts full communiqués quickly on X. Its use of Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Pidgin for meeting notices is a promising start (21st Century Chronicle). But the presentation itself is a text-heavy reading of the communiqué by the Governor alone.
What Nigeria should add
• More infographics: a one-page visual on decision day showing the MPR, the corridor, the CRR, inflation and the reasons for the decision, and charts inside the Governor's presentation. The September 2026 cut of 350 basis points to 23% (Nairametrics) was exactly the kind of move a chart explains better than text.
• A second MPC review meeting with the Deputy Governor for Economic Policy, the Director of Monetary Policy and external MPC members presenting their views to analysts, banks and the press.
• Published minutes or personal statements by members, which the CBN has released in the past and should make routine again.
• Full decision summaries, not just meeting notices, in Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Pidgin, distributed by radio and WhatsApp as well as X.
• A French summary for ECOWAS neighbours such as Benin, Niger and Cameroon, whose traders are directly exposed to the naira.
Egypt: a huge economy that should be louder about its decisions
The CBE runs one of the continent's busiest calendars, eight meetings a year, and its statements are already bilingual in Arabic and English (Bnok24). Egypt is one of Africa's largest economies and among its most populous countries, with a heavily followed bond and currency market. Yet the CBE holds no press conference after its meetings, so its decisions rely on a written release and on others to explain them.
What Egypt should add
• A post-decision press conference by the Governor, streamed and archived, after each meeting.
• A second MPC review meeting for analysts and the press, with the Sub-Governor for Monetary Policy and other MPC members presenting.
• Much more active promotion of decisions across the Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and YouTube channels launched in August 2025 (section 8), with short videos in spoken Egyptian Arabic and infographics.
• Translations beyond Arabic and English, starting with French for North African and Francophone African readers.
• Minutes or a vote summary, which no North African central bank currently publishes.
DR Congo: a giant population, a French-only message
The DRC is one of Africa's most populous countries and is Africa's second largest country by land area. It's also one of the most mineral rich nations on earth, and has a fast-growing mining economy. The BCC's CPM now meets on a more predictable schedule, and the Governor announces decisions in person (Actualite.cd). But its communiqués are in French only, are read mostly through local press, and no active social channel for monetary policy was found.
What the DRC should add
• An English version of every CPM communiqué on the same day, given the international mining investors and East African neighbours following the franc congolais. The DRC joined the East African Community in 2022, where English is the working language.
• Summaries in the four national languages, Lingala, Kiswahili, Kikongo and Tshiluba, which academic work has argued would strengthen the BCC's influence on expectations (MPRA).
• A recorded press conference and a second review meeting with BCC directors presenting the inflation and exchange-rate outlook.
• A published calendar for the year and a Monetary Policy Report with charts.
Ethiopia: a new MPC that can build in best practice from the start
Ethiopia is Africa's second most populous country, one of its fastest-growing economies, and host to the African Union, which makes Addis Ababa the continent's diplomatic capital. It is now moving to an interest-rate framework. Its MPC is young (first meeting in 2024) and already issues numbered releases, and in July 2026 the Governor addressed the press directly after an MPC for the first time, with a written English statement (NBE). Statements have not always stated the new numerical rate (Addis Fortune).
What Ethiopia should add
• Make the Governor's press briefing routine after every meeting, recorded and posted online.
• State the policy rate and every changed number in each release.
• A second MPC review meeting where the chief economist and other MPC members present.
• Amharic and Afaan Oromo versions for domestic audiences, alongside English, and a French summary for Djibouti and Francophone readers in the region.
• A published annual calendar to replace "reconvene by" language.
South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt: the three giants and the second session
South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt are consistently ranked among Africa's largest economies, and together they account for a large share of the continent's GDP and of foreign portfolio investment into Africa. What their central banks say travels further than any other African monetary policy message. All three should adopt the same core package:
• A second MPC review meeting after every decision, with other MPC members and the chief economist presenting. The SARB does this twice a year (section 3.8); Nigeria and Egypt do not do it at all.
• Infographics rich in simplified data, built into the Governor's presentation and every follow-up session, not posted separately afterwards.
• A recorded, streamed press conference every time. Egypt is the outlier here and should start holding them.
• Translations beyond the main official language. Egypt in particular should promote its decisions far more widely and translate beyond Arabic and English.
The DRC and Ethiopia: pull up their game
As the other two giants by population, the DRC and Ethiopia should raise the quality of their main sessions first: a full statement with numbers, a recorded Governor's briefing and open Q&A. They should then add second sessions, and publish every statement in both English and French plus their main national languages (Lingala, Kiswahili, Kikongo and Tshiluba in the DRC; Amharic and Afaan Oromo in Ethiopia).
A disservice to Africa: the data left unused
These economies hold some of the richest economic data on the continent, and their MPC sessions are the natural place to showcase it. Today most of that data stays in statistical bulletins that few people read. By not presenting it, they are doing a disservice to Africa: investors, journalists, researchers and their own citizens lose a clear, regular picture of how the continent's biggest economies are performing.
Everything starts with data. A government cannot plan schools without knowing how many children there are, cannot target a fuel or food subsidy without knowing who pays what, and a central bank cannot steer inflation if people do not trust or understand the numbers. Data that is collected but never explained is a public investment left idle. A local MP, Governor, Senator, Mayor cannot lead, create policies, budget, or govern properly without knowing, or having fairly accurate estimates of number of people they lead. Many African leaders are using bad, or incorrect data to pass policies, budgets and to govern. Good data is also good for planning in all sectors of the economy.
Africa's data gap: collected late, used little
Africa has made progress, but it still lags other regions in both collecting and using economic data. Several of the continent's largest countries are working from old foundations. Nigeria's last population census was held in 2006, the DRC's in 1984 and Ethiopia's in 2007, with later rounds repeatedly postponed. Without a recent census, every survey, per-person figure and budget allocation built on population counts is less reliable. Household budget and labour force surveys are often years apart, GDP base years go stale, and regional or district-level figures are rarely published at all.
The second problem is use. Even where good data exists, it is typically released as long PDF bulletins or spreadsheet tables with technical labels, no plain-language explanation and no local-language version. Ministries, parliaments, county or state governments and ordinary citizens rarely use it to make decisions, and the press quotes only the headline inflation number. Data that nobody uses gives statistical offices little reason, and little budget, to collect more of it.
What the statistical bodies already hold
Each of the big economies has a national statistics office alongside its central bank. Together they hold far more than is ever shown in public:
|
Country |
Statistics office and central bank |
Data that already exists |
How it could be shown to citizens |
|
Kenya |
KNBS; CBK |
Consumer prices by item and county, Economic Survey, labour force and household surveys, CEOs and Market Perceptions surveys, Agriculture Sector Survey, diaspora remittances, mobile-money flows, credit by sector |
Monthly "price of a basket" chart by county; remittances and mobile-money tracker; credit to farmers and small businesses |
|
Nigeria |
NBS; CBN |
Food and core inflation by state, labour force survey, PMI, FX market turnover, external reserves, private-sector credit, oil output, trade by product |
Food prices by state map; naira and reserves tracker; "what the rate cut means for loans" explainer in Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Pidgin |
|
Egypt |
CAPMAS; CBE |
Quarterly inflation path, real interest rate, Suez Canal and tourism receipts, remittances, net international reserves, unemployment by governorate |
Real interest rate on savings; Suez Canal, tourism and remittance earnings on one page; prices by governorate |
|
South Africa |
Stats SA; SARB |
QPM rate path and scenarios, inflation expectations surveys, wage settlements, fuel and electricity prices, household debt, quarterly labour force survey |
Rate path fan chart; fuel, electricity and food cost tracker; jobs by province |
|
DR Congo |
INS; BCC |
Official and parallel exchange rates, mining export receipts, gold reserve accumulation, liquidity and BCC bill operations, Kinshasa prices |
Franc congolais tracker; mining revenue chart; prices in Kinshasa and the provinces, in French, English and Lingala |
|
Ethiopia |
Ethiopian Statistics Service; NBE |
Inflation by region, credit growth after the removal of the credit cap, FX auction results, export surrender data, coffee and gold export earnings |
Inflation by region map; birr and FX auction tracker; export earnings chart in Amharic, Afaan Oromo and English |
Every item in this table is already gathered by the central bank or the national statistics office; several appear in the statements reviewed for this report. Presenting them as simple charts at each MPC session would cost little and would make these banks the go-to source on Africa's largest economies.
Simplified for the common citizen
The test is whether a market trader, a farmer or a student can understand the chart in under a minute. That means:
• Label everything and make more use of simple, easy to understand infographics. Every chart carries a plain title, the unit, the date, the source and the next release date.
• Lead with what matters to households: the cost of a basket of everyday goods, the exchange rate, loan and savings rates, and jobs, before GDP and the balance of payments.
• Go local. Break figures down by county, state, province or region so people can see their own area, not just a national average.
• Translate. Release the one-page summary in the main national languages, and in English and French for regional readers.
• Publish openly. Put the data behind every chart on an open portal as a free download, on a published release calendar, so journalists and researchers can check and reuse it.
Data for better governance
Well-organised public data does more than inform. It makes government simpler and more accountable:
• Budgets and subsidies can be aimed at the regions and groups that need them, using regional price and income data.
• Food and fuel price tracking gives early warning of shortages and lets ministries act before prices spike.
• Parliaments, county or state governments and citizens can check promises against published numbers.
• Investors and lenders price risk better, which lowers the cost of borrowing for the whole country.
• Central banks, statistics offices and finance ministries sharing one data platform avoid conflicting figures and duplicated surveys.
Examples of data each could put on screen at every MPC session:
|
Country |
Data already collected that could be showcased |
|
Kenya |
CEOs Survey, Market Perceptions Survey, Agriculture Sector Survey, diaspora remittances, mobile-money flows, private-sector credit by sector |
|
Nigeria |
Inflation by food and core components, FX market turnover, external reserves, credit to the private sector, PMI, oil output |
|
Egypt |
Quarterly inflation path, real interest rate margin, Suez Canal and tourism receipts, remittances, net international reserves |
|
South Africa |
QPM rate path and scenarios, inflation expectations surveys, wage settlements, fuel and electricity prices, household credit |
|
DR Congo |
Exchange rate on official and parallel markets, mining export receipts, gold reserve accumulation, liquidity and BCC bill operations |
|
Ethiopia |
Credit growth after removal of the credit cap, foreign-exchange auction results, export surrender data, inflation by region |
Every item in this table is already gathered by the central bank or the national statistics office; several appear in the statements reviewed for this report. Presenting them as simple charts at each MPC session would cost little and would make these banks the go-to source on Africa's largest economies.
The MPC session is the ideal shop window for all of this. It happens on a fixed date, it already draws the press and markets, and the Governor is already presenting numbers. If Africa's largest economies used each session to present clearly labelled, simplified data, and statistics offices funded more frequent censuses and surveys to feed it, they would serve their own citizens and set the standard for the rest of the continent.
The population and economy-size comparisons in this section are described in broad terms deliberately; exact current figures were not re-checked for this report.
5. The monetary unions: one statement for 14 countries
The BCEAO and BEAC are regular and punctual but terse. Each issues a one- to two-page French communiqué four times a year, which is the main reason 14 African countries look "silent" on monetary policy when they are not.
5.1 BCEAO (West Africa, 8 countries)
Frequency: four ordinary CPM meetings a year, in March, June, September and December. In 2026 the CPM cut rates 25 basis points on 4 March (effective 16 March), then held on 10 June and 9 September (BCEAO June and September communiqués).
Depth: the communiqué is eight numbered paragraphs covering the international context, union inflation (0.4% in Q2 2026, forecast 1.0% for the year), growth (6.1% forecast), the external position and bank credit (+6.6% to end-June). The Governor, Jean-Claude Kassi Brou, gives an opening and closing address that local media report in more depth than the communiqué itself (Dakaractu).
What's missing: no country-level breakdown, no minutes, no vote, no English version (despite Guinea-Bissau being Lusophone and markets watching from Lagos and Accra), and no Wolof, Bambara, Hausa or Mooré summaries. The eight national agencies do not hold their own post-CPM briefings, so a farmer in Mali or a trader in Lomé has no local entry point. The official X account (@BCEAO_Officiel) is low-activity; CPM material goes mainly to the website and YouTube.
5.2 BEAC (Central Africa, 6 countries)
Frequency: roughly quarterly. 2026 sessions were 2 April (hold at 4.75%), 29 June (cut to 4.50%, held by videoconference) and 28 September (hold) (Ecomatin; BEAC communiqué; Gabon Media Time).
Depth: the communiqué gives regional projections for growth, inflation, budget balance, current account, money supply, reserves in months of imports and external currency cover, then lists every instrument changed. It is denser than the BCEAO's on numbers.
What's missing: one French text serves Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Congo, the Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea, the only Spanish-speaking country in Africa. No Spanish version was found, which leaves Equatorial Guinea's public with no communication in its official language. The posted PDF of the June 2026 communiqué is a scan with OCR errors, sitting in a 2016 upload folder, a small but telling sign of website housekeeping. Its X account (@beac1972) shows no posts at all.
5.3 Why the unions look worse than they are
Measured per country, the CFA unions look like 14 "inactive" central banks. Measured per decision, they are about as punctual as Kenya or Uganda. The real problems are:
• Distance: one communiqué from Dakar or Yaoundé for 8 or 6 countries with different inflation and growth rates.
• Language: French only, for unions that include a Lusophone and a Hispanophone member.
• Depth: no minutes, no Q&A transcript, no published forecast fan chart.
• National agencies: they have websites and staff but no mandate to explain decisions locally.
Simple fixes would be an English and Portuguese (BCEAO) or English and Spanish (BEAC) version on the same day, a recorded Governor press conference posted to YouTube, and a one-page national annex per member state.
5.4 Other non-English national banks
• Comoros (Banque Centrale des Comores): pegged to the euro; policy changes arrive as circulars signed by the Governor, such as the January 2026 circular setting reserve requirements and BCC rates (RegAlert). The 2024 banking law created a monetary policy and reserves committee (Financial Afrik), but no regular MPC communiqué was found.
• Mauritania (BCM): a Conseil de politique monétaire that raised the rate to 6.5% in May 2026 (Financial Afrik). Communication is improving but irregular.
• Cabo Verde (BCV): sets rates twice a year when presenting its Monetary Policy Report, with a press conference by the Governor (Forbes África Lusófona). A new central bank law took effect in January 2026 (Boletim Oficial); no 2026 rate communiqué surfaced in searches.
• São Tomé and Príncipe (BCSTP): pegged to the euro; the Governor gives a year-end economic review, but no MPC calendar or decision communiqués were found (Forbes África Lusófona).
6. The least active central banks
Ten monetary authorities show little or no regular MPC communication in 2026. For most, the cause is structural (war, a currency board, dollarization, or a framework still being built) rather than simple neglect. That distinction matters for anyone recommending fixes.
6.1 Least active list (most inactive first)
|
# |
Central bank |
What was found for 2026 |
Main cause |
|
1 |
Bank of Eritrea |
No MPC, no published rate decisions, minimal web presence |
Closed economy, no rate-based framework |
|
2 |
Central Bank of Djibouti |
No rate-setting MPC by design |
Currency board pegged to the US dollar |
|
3 |
Central Bank of Somalia |
No policy rate; an Annual Economic Policy Conference and statements on the planned new shilling (Dawan Africa) |
Economy dollarized since 1991; currency board planned |
|
4 |
Central Bank of Libya |
An MPC exists and recommended a 14.7% dinar devaluation at its first 2026 meeting (Okaz), but there are no scheduled MPC communiqués; the website posts mostly salary and FX notices |
Split government, no unified budget |
|
5 |
Central Bank of Sudan |
One annual policy circular for 2026 (AllAfrica) and ad hoc FX statements; no MPC meetings |
Civil war since April 2023; currency replacement plan (Capmad) |
|
6 |
Bank of South Sudan |
Board of Directors meetings on "monetary policy issues" in January and February 2026, with no rate, no statement content, no calendar (BoSS) |
Three governors in a short span; weak framework |
|
7 |
Banque Centrale des Comores |
Governor's circulars setting rates; no MPC communiqué (RegAlert) |
Euro peg; committee only created under 2024 law |
|
8 |
Banco Central de São Tomé e Príncipe |
Year-end Governor's review; daily FX bulletin; no MPC calendar |
Euro peg; very small institution |
|
9 |
Banque d'Algérie |
Conseil Monétaire et Bancaire meets irregularly; last widely reported rate decision was August 2025 (Algérie Eco) |
Liquidity-driven framework; the IMF notes weak interest-rate transmission |
|
10 |
Banque de la République du Burundi |
Policy rate adopted in 2024 with a promise of quarterly press statements (IMF); no 2026 MPC communiqué found; the IMF urged better statistics in September 2026 (Financial Afrik) |
New framework, thin capacity |
Items 1 and 2 rest on the known design of those regimes rather than a 2026 document; searches returned no 2026 policy communications for either.
6.2 The "footnote" communicators
Above the clearly inactive group sits a band that does meet and announce, but with statements so brief they read like footnotes, or with irregular dates:
• Mauritania (BCM): decisions reach the public mainly through financial press rather than a scheduled, archived communiqué series.
• Guinea (BCRG): numbered communiqués exist, but the most visible 2026 monetary policy content is the Governor's speech to the transitional parliament.
• Cabo Verde (BCV): rates are set only twice a year, alongside the Monetary Policy Report.
• BEAC: detailed numbers, but no recorded press conference, an empty X account and a scanned PDF in a misdated folder.
• Tunisia (BCT): good written communiqués but no press conference and no MPC distinct from the Board.
6.3 What the inactive group has in common
• No published calendar. If the date is not announced, there is nothing for the press or markets to plan around.
• No separate MPC. Decisions are taken by a Board or the Governor alone, so there is no committee to explain.
• Websites that post operations, not policy. Salary disbursement notices, auctions and FX tables dominate front pages.
• Social media used for ceremonies. Where accounts exist, they show signing ceremonies and visits rather than policy explanations.
7. The full ranking: all 42 monetary authorities
South Africa ranks first with 90 out of 100 and Eritrea last with 1. Six banks (ranks 1 to 6) clear the Tier 1 bar of 75; the ten at the bottom (ranks 33 to 42) score below 25. The BCEAO line covers Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo; the BEAC line covers Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Together the 42 rows account for all 54 countries.

"Latest MPC output found" is the website-freshness test: the most recent MPC statement, communiqué or decision this review could find on the bank's own site or in press reports, as of 12 October 2026.
|
Rank |
Central bank |
Countries |
Language of MPC output |
2026 MPC decisions found |
Latest MPC output found |
Live briefing |
Second layer |
Outreach and local language |
|
1 |
SARB |
South Africa |
English |
Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Sep (Nov due) |
23 Sep 2026 |
Yes, streamed and clipped on X |
Vote split, QPM rate path, scenarios, twice-yearly Monetary Policy Review |
National forum plus 7 regional forums |
|
2 |
Bank of Ghana |
Ghana |
English |
Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Sep |
24 Sep 2026 |
Yes, with full transcript |
Members' written submissions, media Q&A file |
None found |
|
3 |
Bank of Namibia |
Namibia |
English |
Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug (Oct due) |
12 Aug 2026 |
Yes |
Full minutes, slide deck, independent external member |
Governor's stakeholder engagement deck |
|
4 |
Bank of Botswana |
Botswana |
English, Setswana |
Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug (29 Oct due) |
27 Aug 2026 |
Yes, media briefing |
Annual Monetary Policy Statement, Monetary Policy Reports |
Setswana press releases |
|
5 |
National Bank of Rwanda |
Rwanda |
English |
Feb, May, Aug, Oct |
Oct 2026 (recorded on YouTube) |
Yes, Governor with team |
Joint MPC and FSC statement |
Chief Economist and Deputy Governor present; X Spaces |
|
6 |
Bank of Mauritius |
Mauritius |
English |
Feb and later (rate raised to 4.75% in May) |
May 2026 rate data |
Yes |
Minutes two weeks after each meeting |
None found |
|
7 |
Central Bank of Nigeria |
Nigeria |
English |
Feb, May, Jul, Sep |
22 Sep 2026 |
Yes, live-streamed |
Full parameter communiqué |
MPC notices in Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Pidgin on X |
|
8 |
Central Bank of Liberia |
Liberia |
English, Simple Liberian English |
Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct |
6 Oct 2026 |
Yes |
Numbered communiqués, annual Policy Statement |
Simplified and vernacular versions |
|
9 |
Bank Al-Maghrib |
Morocco |
Arabic, French |
Mar, Jun, Sep |
22 Sep 2026 |
Normally (skipped in Sep for the election) |
Full Monetary Policy Report |
Meetings with sector leaders |
|
10 |
Central Bank of Kenya |
Kenya |
English |
Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug, Oct |
7 Oct 2026 |
Yes, video archive |
Survey evidence cited; six-monthly report to Parliament |
Virtual post-MPC stakeholder meetings |
|
11 |
Central Bank of Egypt |
Egypt |
Arabic, English |
Feb, Apr, May, Jul, Aug, Sep |
24 Sep 2026 |
No |
Detailed statement with forecast revisions |
None found |
|
12 |
Bank of Tanzania |
Tanzania |
English; Kiswahili site version |
Jan, Apr, Jul (Oct due) |
3 Jul 2026 |
Yes |
Quarterly Monetary Policy Report |
Kiswahili site and posts |
|
13 |
Central Bank of The Gambia |
The Gambia |
English |
Feb, May, Aug |
Aug 2026 |
Yes |
Numbered minutes, Monetary Policy Report |
None found |
|
14 |
Bank of Uganda |
Uganda |
English |
Feb, May, Aug |
13 Aug 2026 |
Yes |
Two-page statement |
One-page plain-language summary |
|
15 |
Banco Nacional de Angola |
Angola |
Portuguese |
Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Sep (Nov due) |
15 Sep 2026 |
Yes |
Detailed communiqué |
Meetings rotated to provinces |
|
16 |
Bank of Zambia |
Zambia |
English |
Feb, May, Sep |
Sep 2026 |
Yes |
Quarterly inflation forecast |
None found |
|
17 |
Banco de Moçambique |
Mozambique |
Portuguese |
Jan, Mar, May and later |
May 2026 (latest found) |
Yes |
Detailed communiqué |
None found |
|
18 |
Central Bank of Eswatini |
Eswatini |
English |
Several, latest 25 Sep |
25 Sep 2026 |
Yes |
Annual Monetary Policy Statement |
Consultative committee; Coffee with the Governor |
|
19 |
Reserve Bank of Malawi |
Malawi |
English |
Mar, Apr, Aug, Sep (Oct due) |
Sep 2026 |
Yes |
Short statement |
State broadcaster coverage |
|
20 |
BCEAO |
8 UEMOA states |
French |
Mar, Jun, Sep |
9 Sep 2026 |
Governor's addresses |
8-paragraph communiqué |
None; no English or Portuguese |
|
21 |
Central Bank of Lesotho |
Lesotho |
English |
Feb, Mar and later |
Early 2026 |
Yes |
Short statement |
None found |
|
22 |
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe |
Zimbabwe |
English |
Jun, Sep and others |
30 Sep 2026 |
Yes |
Numbered resolutions |
None found |
|
23 |
Banky Foiben'i Madagasikara |
Madagascar |
French |
May, Aug and others |
Aug 2026 |
Yes |
Economic conjuncture notes |
None found |
|
24 |
National Bank of Ethiopia |
Ethiopia |
English |
Mar, Jul |
Jul 2026 |
First in Jul 2026 |
Numbered releases |
None found |
|
25 |
Central Bank of Seychelles |
Seychelles |
English |
Q1, Q2 and later |
Mar 2026 (latest found) |
Yes |
Short communiqué |
None found |
|
26 |
Banque Centrale du Congo |
DR Congo |
French |
Apr, Jul |
17 Jul 2026 |
Yes |
Communiqué |
None found |
|
27 |
Bank of Sierra Leone |
Sierra Leone |
English |
Mar and later |
Apr 2026 (latest found) |
Yes |
Short statement |
None found |
|
28 |
Banque Centrale de Tunisie |
Tunisia |
French, Arabic |
Feb, Mar, Jun, Jul, Oct |
7 Oct 2026 |
No |
Detailed Board communiqué |
None found |
|
29 |
Banco de Cabo Verde |
Cabo Verde |
Portuguese |
Twice-yearly |
None found for 2026 |
Yes, with report |
Monetary Policy Report |
None found |
|
30 |
BEAC |
6 CEMAC states |
French |
Apr, Jun, Sep |
28 Sep 2026 |
No recorded briefing found |
Numbers-rich communiqué |
None; no Spanish for Equatorial Guinea |
|
31 |
BCRG |
Guinea |
French |
None found |
Mar 2026 parliamentary speech |
Partial |
Numbered communiqués (2025) |
Parliament speeches |
|
32 |
Banque Centrale de Mauritanie |
Mauritania |
Arabic, French |
May |
May 2026 |
Unclear |
Press coverage only |
None found |
|
33 |
Banque de la République du Burundi |
Burundi |
French |
None found |
None found |
None found |
None found |
None found |
|
34 |
Banque d'Algérie |
Algeria |
Arabic, French |
None found |
Aug 2025 |
No |
Short communiqué |
None found |
|
35 |
BCSTP |
São Tomé and Príncipe |
Portuguese |
None |
Year-end review |
No |
None |
None |
|
36 |
Banque Centrale des Comores |
Comoros |
French |
Circulars only |
Jan 2026 circular |
No |
None |
None |
|
37 |
Bank of South Sudan |
South Sudan |
English |
Board meetings only |
Feb 2026 |
No |
None |
None |
|
38 |
Central Bank of Sudan |
Sudan |
Arabic |
Annual circular |
Jan 2026 |
No |
None |
None |
|
39 |
Central Bank of Libya |
Libya |
Arabic |
One MPC, early 2026 |
Early 2026 |
No |
None |
None |
|
40 |
Central Bank of Somalia |
Somalia |
Somali, English, Arabic |
No policy rate |
Jul 2026 conference |
No |
Annual report |
Annual Economic Policy Conference |
|
41 |
Central Bank of Djibouti |
Djibouti |
French, Arabic |
No MPC (currency board) |
Not applicable |
No |
None |
None |
|
42 |
Bank of Eritrea |
Eritrea |
Not applicable |
None |
None found |
No |
None |
None |
On social media: the digital component (5 of 100 points) is scored from evidence that surfaced in search: SARB video clips and summaries on X, CBN's multilingual X posts, Eswatini's Facebook decision posts, CBK's video archive, Rwanda's recorded October statement and X Spaces, and BoSS's linked Facebook and X accounts. A fuller, account-by-account view is in section 8, where the social ranking differs noticeably from this one.
8. Social media: who posts MPC decisions on X and beyond
On social media the ranking shifts. Rwanda, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa lead on both substance and social posting, while Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia do much better on X than their overall scores suggest. Namibia, Botswana and Mauritius communicate well on their websites but post less on social platforms.
This section draws on a separate survey of the X (formerly Twitter) accounts of African central banks in October 2026, with notes on Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and YouTube. That survey ranked banks on how recently and how fully they post MPC statements, briefings and follow-up material, not on follower counts. Its findings have not been re-checked post by post and are kept as a separate ranking rather than folded into the composite scores in section 7.
8.1 The accounts
|
Central bank |
Main account(s) |
Social tier |
What the survey found on MPC posting |
Overall rank |
|
National Bank of Rwanda |
@CentralBankRw on X; YouTube |
1 |
Detailed Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Statement posts, with replays, breakdowns and X Spaces; monitors public sentiment on X |
5 |
|
Bank of Ghana |
@thebankofghana on X |
1 |
MPC press briefings, excerpts, rate decisions and post-MPC engagement with banks around the 132nd meeting |
2 |
|
Central Bank of Nigeria |
@cenbank on X |
1 |
Prompt full communiqués with PDF links, e.g. the 307th meeting in September 2026; large audience |
7 |
|
South African Reserve Bank |
@SAReserveBank on X; multi-platform |
1 |
Rate decisions, statements, explainers and live broadcasts |
1 |
|
Bank of Uganda |
@BOU_Official on X |
1 |
MPC statements and decisions; high overall posting volume |
14 |
|
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe |
@ReserveBankZIM on X |
1 |
MPC resolutions (September 2026) and quarterly snapshots; large following |
22 |
|
Bank of Zambia |
@BankofZambia on X |
1 |
Rate decisions with links to statements, incl. September 2026 |
16 |
|
Central Bank of Kenya |
@CBKKenya on X; YouTube |
2 |
Press briefings and YouTube streams, incl. October 2026 |
10 |
|
Bank of Namibia |
@BankofNamibia on X |
2 |
MPC decisions and hosted policy dialogues |
3 |
|
Bank Al-Maghrib |
@BankAlMaghrib on X; multi-platform |
2 |
Board meeting outcomes, research and indicators |
9 |
|
Bank of Tanzania |
@BankOfTanzania on X, Facebook, Instagram |
2 |
Policy and economic updates, often in Kiswahili |
12 |
|
Bank of Botswana |
@BankofBotswana on X |
2 |
Periodic activity |
4 |
|
Banco de Moçambique |
Accounts exist |
2 |
Periodic activity |
17 |
|
Central Bank of Egypt |
Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, YouTube (launched Aug 2025) |
3 |
New channels for policy and economic updates; little use of X |
11 |
|
Bank of Mauritius |
@BoM_Mauritius on X |
3 |
Occasional MPC posts |
6 |
|
BCEAO |
@BCEAO_Officiel on X; YouTube |
3 |
Low X activity; CPM material on website and YouTube; has warned the public about fake accounts |
20 |
|
BEAC |
@beac1972 on X; LinkedIn |
3 |
X account shows zero posts; relies on website and LinkedIn |
30 |
|
Central Bank of Lesotho |
@BankLesotho on X |
3 |
Sparse |
21 |
|
Bank of South Sudan |
Facebook and @bss_original on X, linked from its website |
Not rated |
Accounts exist; MPC content not observed |
37 |
|
Central Bank of Somalia |
@CentralBankSo on X |
3 |
Minimal monetary policy content |
40 |
|
Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Malawi, Madagascar |
Not given |
3 |
MPC statements mainly on websites; social accounts sparse or not used for policy |
8, 27, 13, 19, 23 |
|
Eritrea, Djibouti, Comoros and other small or conflict-affected states |
Not given |
3 |
Minimal or no social media for monetary policy |
36 and below |
The Bank of South Sudan row comes from the bank's own website, which links Facebook and X accounts; it was not part of the social media survey.
8.2 Where social media and overall communication diverge
Putting the survey next to the composite ranking produces four groups.
|
Group |
Banks |
What it means |
|
Strong on both |
South Africa, Ghana, Rwanda, Nigeria |
Deep statements pushed out quickly on X with briefings, replays and explainers. Rwanda's X Spaces and sentiment monitoring are the most interactive practice found anywhere on the continent. |
|
Social-first |
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Zambia |
Tier 1 on X but mid-table overall: shorter statements, no minutes or member views. Their social reach could carry more substance, such as Uganda's one-page summary or a forecast chart. |
|
Substance-first |
Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius, Liberia, The Gambia |
Minutes, Setswana releases, simplified versions or full reports on the website reach far fewer people than they could. Liberia's Simple Liberian English communiqué is a strong candidate for WhatsApp and radio. |
|
Weak on both |
BEAC, BCEAO, most banks in section 6 |
An X account with no posts (BEAC), a quiet official account covering eight countries (BCEAO), or no policy content at all. |
8.3 Platform patterns
• X is the main channel for English-speaking banks. It is where rate decisions appear first for Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia.
• YouTube matters for briefings. Kenya streams post-MPC briefings there, Rwanda posted its October 2026 statement there, and the BCEAO uses it for CPM material.
• Egypt chose other platforms. The CBE launched Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and YouTube channels in August 2025 for policy updates rather than building up X. Facebook reaches more people than X in Egypt.
• Local languages travel well on social media. Tanzania posts often in Kiswahili, and the CBN's Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Pidgin MPC notices (section 9) were posted on X.
• Fake accounts are a real risk. The BCEAO and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe have warned about impostor accounts. Verified badges and a list of official handles on the bank's website help.
• Regional banks lag. Francophone and union central banks favour their websites; the survey found the BCEAO and BEAC the least active major institutions on X.
8.4 Caveats on the survey data
• Handles need to be re-verified. Account names come from the survey; check them against each bank's website before relying on them, given the impostor-account problem.
• Recency, not reach. The survey ranks how up to date MPC posting is, not engagement or follower counts.
• Coverage is thinner below Tier 2. Many smaller banks are grouped together rather than checked individually.
9. Reaching people in their own languages
Only a handful of African central banks translate MPC decisions into the languages most of their citizens speak, and none does it systematically across all its outputs. Four practices stand out in 2026.
|
Central bank |
What it does |
Languages |
Source |
|
Central Bank of Liberia |
Publishes the full communiqué, a simplified version, and a version in Simple Liberian English |
English, Liberian English |
CBL |
|
Bank of Botswana |
Publishes MPC decision press releases in Setswana alongside English |
English, Setswana |
BoB |
|
Central Bank of Nigeria |
Announced its MPC meeting on X in four Nigerian languages |
Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Pidgin |
21st Century Chronicle |
| Bank of Tanzania | Publishes MPC
decision press releases in Kiswahili and English on their website |
Kiswahili | BoT |
|
Bank of Uganda |
Publishes a one-page plain-language summary with every statement |
English (plain language) |
BoU |
A related practice is taking the meeting itself to the regions. Angola's BNA held its July 2026 CPM in Malanje rather than Luanda (Ver Angola), and the SARB takes its Monetary Policy Review to seven provincial cities each round (SARB).
The gap is largest where it matters most
The biggest missed opportunities are in countries where the language most people speak is not the language of the central bank's statements:
• Kiswahili in Kenya (and across the East African Community), where the CBK publishes in English only.
• Kinyarwanda in Rwanda, where almost everyone speaks it; a Kinyarwanda MPC summary was not found.
• Wolof, Bambara, Hausa and Mooré across the BCEAO zone, where the only communiqué is in French.
• Spanish for Equatorial Guinea in the BEAC, a constitutional language with no translation.
• Portuguese for Guinea-Bissau in the BCEAO.
• Amharic and Afaan Oromo in Ethiopia; Lingala, Kiswahili, Kikongo and Tshiluba in the DRC.
• Darija and Amazigh in Morocco, and Kreol Morisien in Mauritius.
• isiZulu, isiXhosa and Sesotho in South Africa, the best-resourced bank on the continent.
Academic work on the Banque Centrale du Congo makes the same point: communicating in Lingala, Kikongo, Swahili and Tshiluba, not only French, would strengthen the bank's grip on expectations (MPRA).
What a low-cost translation model looks like
• Translate the one-page summary, not the full statement; Uganda's one-pager shows the format.
• Record a three-minute audio version for radio and WhatsApp; radio still reaches more people than websites in most of the continent.
• Post it the same day as the English or French decision, from the bank's own accounts.
• For the unions, let each national agency of the BCEAO and BEAC publish the national-language summary.
10. A blueprint for better MPC communication
The practices already used by the leaders, and by surprising mid-table banks such as Liberia and The Gambia, add up to a template any African central bank could adopt within a year at modest cost. Each list below is ordered by cost, cheapest first.
10.1 For every central bank
• Publish a 12-month MPC calendar in January and keep it. Kenya, Namibia and Botswana name the next date in every statement; that habit alone separates Tier 2 from Tier 4.
• Post the decision on the bank's own website first. Several banks' decisions surface in the press before, or instead of, on their own sites.
• Add a one-page plain-language summary. Uganda's at a glance page and Liberia's simplified communiqué are ready-made templates.
• Stream and archive the press conference. The CBK's video library, the CBN's live stream and Rwanda's YouTube replay cost little and create a permanent record.
• Translate the summary into the main national language. Botswana (Setswana) and Liberia (Liberian English) show it can be routine.
10.2 For the "could do better" group
Kenya, Nigeria, Mozambique, Angola, Morocco, Lesotho, Eswatini and Uganda:
• Hold a follow-up review session within two weeks. Use the SARB's forum format, Rwanda's team presentation or Namibia's stakeholder engagement: the Governor opens, and the Chief Economist and a Deputy Governor present the forecast and the risks.
• Let other MPC members speak. Ghana's written member submissions and Namibia's and The Gambia's minutes show how individual views can be published without undermining the decision.
• Publish a full Monetary Policy Report at least twice a year, with fan charts and a forecast table.
• Make the materials bilingual where markets need it: Mozambique and Angola in English; Kenya in Kiswahili; Morocco in English.
• Have organized presentations: Some MPC presentations are hard to follow, because the presenters keep on switching to a different language, so its hard for people interested in monetary policy, but not from that country to follow. So create language time slots, or standards to be followed in a presentation. If using Sesotho (Stick to Sesotho for the duration of the presentation (for example 10 mins)). If English, or French, then stick to that language for the duration of the presentation. This is because many people follow these sessions from around Africa and other parts of the World. Its also hard to us Ai to translate a jumbled up presentation.
10.3 For the monetary unions
• Same-day translations: BCEAO in English and Portuguese, BEAC in English and Spanish.
• A national annex in each communiqué with country inflation, growth and credit.
• National agency briefings within a week, in national languages.
• A recorded press conference posted to YouTube and the website, and an active X account.
10.4 For the least active banks
• Establish a statutory MPC with a published charter, separate from the Board, where one does not yet exist.
• Start with a quarterly calendar and a two-page statement. Ethiopia's numbered releases since 2024 show how quickly a new MPC can become regular.
• Use the IMF and regional peer support already on offer. The IMF has explicitly tied quarterly press statements to Burundi's programme.
• Turn the website into a policy site. Put the policy rate, the last decision and the next date on the homepage, ahead of auctions and salary notices.
10.5 For people monitoring African central banks
• Follow the unions, not the 14 member states. Two feeds (BCEAO and BEAC) cover a quarter of Africa's countries.
• Read in French and Portuguese. Morocco, the DRC, Angola and Mozambique publish good material that rarely reaches English-language coverage.
• Watch the second-tier publications. Ghana's members' submissions, the Namibia and Gambia minutes and the Mauritius minutes often say more than the headline decision.
• Use the published calendars. Remaining 2026 dates found in this review:
|
Central bank |
Next MPC date |
|
Bank of Namibia |
26–27 October 2026 |
|
Reserve Bank of Malawi |
28–29 October 2026 |
|
Bank of Botswana |
29 October 2026 |
|
Banco Nacional de Angola |
16–17 November 2026 |
|
South African Reserve Bank |
19 November 2026 |
|
Central Bank of Kenya |
December 2026 |
10.6 On social media
• Post the decision, the full statement link and a one-image summary on X within minutes of the announcement, as the CBN and SARB do.
• Repost the second layer. Minutes, member submissions and Monetary Policy Reports rarely reach social feeds; Namibia, Ghana and The Gambia would gain most.
• Run a live Q&A after major decisions. Rwanda's X Spaces show the format; YouTube or Facebook Live work where X is less used.
• Choose the platform people use. Follow Egypt's lead on Facebook where X reach is low, and use WhatsApp channels and radio clips for local-language summaries.
• Publish a list of official handles on the website and get accounts verified, given the BCEAO's and Zimbabwe's warnings about impostor accounts.
• Revive or close dormant accounts. An official account with no posts, such as the BEAC's on X, signals neglect.
10.7 For Africa's largest economies and most populous countries
Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, the DRC and Ethiopia have the size, data and media attention to communicate at Tier 1 level; the details for each are in section 4.14. As a group they should:
• Hold a second MPC review meeting after every decision, following the SARB and Rwanda models, in person or streamed.
• Put other MPC members on the platform, including the chief economist or Director of Research, Deputy Governors and external members, so the public hears more than one voice.
• Publish minutes, vote counts or written member views, as Ghana, Namibia, Mauritius and The Gambia already do.
• Release a one-page infographic on decision day, which Nigeria in particular should prioritise.
• Translate for regional and international audiences: English for the DRC; French for Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia; plus the main national languages (Kiswahili; Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Pidgin; Lingala, Kikongo and Tshiluba; Amharic and Afaan Oromo).
• Hold a live press conference every time. Egypt should start; Ethiopia should make July 2026's first briefing routine.
• Publish a Monetary Policy Report at least twice a year with forecast charts and the underlying data, putting their large statistical bases to work.
• Showcase internal data at every session: simplified, data-rich charts built into the Governor's presentation and every second session, using the survey, market and statistical data each bank already collects. South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt should lead, and the DRC and Ethiopia should follow.
Sources
Central bank primary documents
• SARB: MPC dates and members; Monetary Policy Forums 2026; Chief Economist appointment
• Bank of Ghana: MPC press releases; members' submissions and transcripts
• Bank of Namibia: August 2026 statement; June 2026 minutes; MPC appointments; stakeholder engagement deck
• Bank of Botswana: press releases incl. Setswana; Monetary Policy Statement 2026; latest news
• Bank of Mauritius: February 2026 MPC release; interest rate data; Governor's statement via BIS
• National Bank of Rwanda: October 2026 Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Statement (YouTube recording)
• Central Bank of Kenya: 7 October 2026 MPC release; CBK multimedia; MPC report to Parliament
• Central Bank of Nigeria: homepage and MPC communiqués
• Bank of Uganda: August 2026 statement; at a glance summary
• Bank of Tanzania: MPC No. 244; Monetary Policy Report July 2026
• Central Bank of Liberia: July 2026 communiqué page; simplified version
• Central Bank of The Gambia: Minutes No. 97; February 2026 press release
• National Bank of Ethiopia: Governor's MPC statement, July 2026
• BCEAO: June and September 2026 communiqués
• BEAC: June 2026 communiqué
• BCRG: 17th CPM communiqué; Governor's March 2026 speech
• Bank of South Sudan: Board meeting, January 2026; Central Bank of Libya homepage
• Central Bank of Eswatini: Governor's media engagement via BIS
Press and secondary sources
• South Africa: SAnews; EWN; Lines.com
• Rwanda: KT Press (August 2026); The New Times (February 2025 and February 2026); IMF staff-level agreement (October 2026)
• Botswana: Capmad
• Nigeria: Nairametrics (September 2026); Financial Edge; 21st Century Chronicle; Peoples Gazette
• Egypt: Egypt Today; Bnok24
• Morocco: Le Matin; Hespress
• Tunisia: Kapitalis
• Algeria: Algérie Eco; IMF selected issues
• Mozambique and Angola: AIM; Ver Angola (July and September)
• Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe: Lusaka Times; RegAlert BoZ circular; MBC; The Herald
• Eswatini and Lesotho: Eswatini Observer; Rio Times; CBL Lesotho
• Ethiopia: Addis Fortune
• West Africa: AllAfrica on Liberia; Gambiana; Awoko on Sierra Leone; Dakaractu on BCEAO
• Central Africa: Ecomatin; Gabon Media Time; Actualite.cd; Capmad on DRC
• Islands: NewsMada; Seychelles Nation; Forbes África Lusófona on Cabo Verde and São Tomé; RegAlert Comoros circular; Financial Afrik on Comoros
• North and Horn of Africa: Financial Afrik on Mauritania; Okaz on Libya; AllAfrica and Capmad on Sudan; Dawan Africa on Somalia
• Burundi: IMF (2024); Financial Afrik (October 2026)
• Language research: MPRA paper on BCC communication
Social media survey
• Survey of African central bank accounts on X, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and YouTube, October 2026
Claude was also used for research and Chat Gpt for the main image graphic of the article
Africa Team
